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Abstract 
 
In 1999, the provincial government of the Western Cape entered into a 
partnership with Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) to provide HIV treatment 
through public health clinics in the peri-urban settlement of Khayelitsha. From 
2000 onwards, this partnership ran South Africa’s first antiretroviral 
treatment (ART) programme. Due to the province’s limited experience in 1999 
in implementing and monitoring an ART programme, and the National Health 
Department’s opposition to the public provision of ART, this partnership was 
instrumental in piloting and later scaling-up the Western Cape’s ART 
programme. The partnership demonstrated that ART programmes could be 
implemented successfully within resource-constrained settings, with high 
levels of adherence, low rates of loss to follow up, and excellent health 
outcomes. Its components and strategies are therefore of vital significance to 
the roll-out and maintenance of ART programmes in various contexts across 
the developing world. Based on information gathered through interviews with 
key players, this article examines the factors that facilitated the public provision 
of ART in the Western Cape. With a focus on Khayelitsha, it explores the 
partnerships that were established between the provincial government, civil 
society organisations, research institutes and service providers to support and 
expedite the public provision of ART.  
 
 
 
2 
Introduction 
 
South Africa has the largest HIV epidemic in the world with approximately 5.7 
million people living with HIV (UNAIDS 2008). At present, over 1 million 
people living in South Africa have initiated antiretroviral therapy (ART) 
(Republic of South Africa 2010). Because of the opposition of high-ranking 
political figures, including President Mbeki and Health Minister Tshabalala-
Msimang, South Africa‟s public provision of ART began relatively late. It was 
not until the end of 2005 that all of South Africa‟s nine provinces had initiated 
pilot programmes for public access to ART (Baleta 1999; Cohen 2000).  
 
According to Nattrass (2008) and Chigwedere et al. (2008), the delays in public 
provision of ART resulted in the loss of over 330,000 lives during Mbeki‟s 
presidential tenure. The opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, was in 
political control of the Provincial Administration of the Western Cape in 1999, 
the year in which the ART pilot began.1 The city‟s relative autonomy enabled its 
Health Department to pilot an ART programme, and it did so in contradiction of 
the policies of the National Department of Health, which officially opposed the 
public provision of ART at this time.  
 
In 1999, the province established a small pilot programme for the prevention of 
mother-to-child-transmission (PMTCT) of HIV at two midwife obstetric units in 
Khayelitsha. Situated thirty kilometers outside Cape Town, Khayelitsha is a 
densely populated township, with 46% of its approximately 500,000 residents 
characterised as unemployed in 2002 (Boulle et al. 2010:  564).2 Residents live 
in a combination of formal and informal housing, and over 80% of household 
dwellings classified as informal (Scott et al. 2005). The HIV prevalence rate in 
Khayelitsha is among the highest in the province (MSF & Infectious Diseases 
Epidemiology Unit at the University of Cape Town, 2003a). In 2007, 
Khayelitsha‟s antenatal prevalence was 30.2% (MSF et al. 2008). 
 
Due to the Health Department‟s opposition to ART provision, public funding, 
infrastructural and institutional support for the Western Cape‟s ART pilot 
programme were lacking. Key actors working within the Provincial 
Administration of the Western Cape therefore established a partnership to 
facilitate its ART roll-out, and to raise external funding to finance the ART 
pilot. This partnership was constituted by a range of actors and organizations, 
                                           
1
 The Provincial Administration of the Western Cape is now known as the Provincial 
Government of the Western Cape. 
2
 The actual population of Khayelitsha remains unknown. This figure is drawn from the 2001 
census and is widely considered to be underestimated. 
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including the Provincial Department of Health, independent health providers, 
civil society organizations, international donors and academic research 
institutes.  
 
 
Methodology 
 
As the first of the partnerships established between the Provincial Health 
Department, NGOs and other service providers, this research focuses on the 
Khayelitsha partnership constituted by the Provincial Health Department, 
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC). 
This article also describes the province‟s relations with other organisations and 
institutes that composed the wider partnership to pilot and then scale up ART in 
the Western Cape. It describes and assesses the partnership that facilitated public 
access to ART in the Western Cape. It is based on primary historical and 
qualitative methodologies, including in-depth interviews with key informants, 
analysis of documentary sources concerning the partnership‟s establishment and 
evolution, and supplementary research on secondary sources evaluating the 
partnership‟s outcomes. Extensive research has been conducted on the 
Khayelitsha ART pilot (Coetzee et al. 2004; Coetzee et al. 2005; Boulle et al. 
2008; Boulle et al. 2010). However, most studies have focused on the 
implications of the roll-out for health systems at provincial and national levels, 
and on the clinical outcomes of the programme. This research focuses instead on 
the partnership that facilitated the pilot‟s success from the perspectives of its key 
participants, assessing the challenges it faced, describing the functioning of its 
various components, and evaluating its organizational strategies and outcomes. 
 
 
Findings 
 
The Western Cape’s introduction of prevention of 
mother-to-child transmission of HIV  
 
In January 1999, the Health Department of the Provincial Administration of the 
Western Cape initiated a pilot PMTCT programme at two midwife-run obstetric 
units in Khayelitsha. The programme was based on evidence from clinical trials 
elsewhere in the world which demonstrated a reduction in mother-to-child-
transmission of HIV of 50% as a result of PMTCT interventions (Abdullah et al. 
2001). At this early stage of ART provision in South Africa, local clinicians had 
begun initiating patients onto ART through the private sector and through 
clinical studies. The knowledge and experience gained by these clinicians meant 
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that they were able to advise and support the province in the Khayelitsha pilot as 
well as subsequent treatment initiatives, particularly regarding the components 
of ART protocols (Boulle et al. 2008). The communication networks that were 
established between clinicians and public health specialists working across the 
public and private sectors therefore provided valuable channels for sharing 
information during the early years of ART initiation in South Africa. In late 
1999, MSF entered into a partnership with the Western Cape provincial government 
and began supporting the Khayelitsha PMTCT programme.  
 
According to Eric Goemaere, the previous head of MSF South Africa and 
currently the organisation‟s Medical Co-ordinator, the reasons for MSF‟s 
involvement in the PMTCT initiative were threefold (pers. comm. Goemaere 
2010). Firstly, South Africa‟s high HIV prevalence and the relative advancement 
of its epidemic meant that there were large numbers of people in need of 
treatment. Secondly, MSF was encouraged by South Africa‟s apparent 
commitment to challenging patent laws preventing the local production and 
import of generic drugs.3 The state‟s attempt to challenge the pricing regime of 
the pharmaceutical industry drew MSF‟s attention as a brave political move that 
cohered with its own objectives of promoting better access to medicines in the 
developing world. And thirdly, MSF hoped to introduce issues around access to 
ART at the 2000 International AIDS Conference in Durban, in order to push the 
issue of universal access onto international development and public health 
agendas. The partnership with the Provincial Administration would provide 
valuable opportunities to gain experience and conduct research on providing 
public access to ART in resource-constrained settings.  
 
Initially MSF had considered starting a PMTCT programme in Alexandra, a 
densely-populated township in Johannesburg. Goemaere visited a public health 
clinic in Alexandra, and was well-received by health workers who were 
„excited‟ by the idea of establishing a PMTCT pilot there (pers. comm. 
Goemaere 2010). However, after this enthusiastic reception, he traveled to 
Pretoria to meet with officials at the National Department of Health to the 
                                           
3
 This perception was based on government‟s modifications to the Medicines and Related 
Substances Control Act in 1997, which proposed the local production and import of generics. 
These modifications were met with a legal challenge by the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Association to the South African government, backed by powerful political actors. South 
Africa was added to a watch list of countries whose attempts to reduce the prices of essential 
medicines were regarded as a challenge to international patent law, embodied in the World 
Trade Organisation‟s regulations on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. 
The amended Medicines and Related Substances Act was never passed. Instead, government 
reached an out of court settlement with the pharmaceutical industry that encouraged reduced 
antiretroviral pricing, but did not challenge the industry‟s patents and pricing regime (Orrell et 
al. 2003). 
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PMTCT pilot to them. There he learned that high-ranking officials within the 
National Department were opposed to piloting PMTCT. Although there was one 
influential government official who supported the initiative, her superiors within 
the Ministry, under the leadership of Health Minister Nkosazana Zuma, vetoed 
the proposal.  
 
Bewildered by the response of the national government, Goemaere prepared to 
leave South Africa. However, he received word from members of the Treatment 
Action Campaign, an HIV activist group advocating for public access to HIV 
treatment, that the Western Cape Health Department had started a PMTCT 
initiative in two antenatal clinics in Khayelitsha. Information networks between 
key actors working within HIV research and advocacy again yielded important 
information. Goemaere travelled to Cape Town to find out more about the 
Khayelitsha programme, where he discovered that it was operational but „very 
low-key‟, because the province „didn‟t want the national [government] to know 
about it‟ (pers. comm. Goemaere 2005). The province was able to provide 
access to ART due to its autonomy from the ruling ANC (ibid). 
  
Through his connections with TAC leaders, Goemaere was introduced to Saadiq 
Kariem, the clinician who was heading the PMTCT pilot in Khayelitsha. They 
worked together at the PMTCT clinic to establish a monitoring and evaluation 
(M&E) system for the programme, and to expand it through the introduction of a 
post-natal phase. Prior to that, the pilot had provided AZT monotherapy to 
pregnant women, but no post-natal treatment for them or their infants (pers. 
comm. Goemaere 2010). Goemaere approached researchers at the School of 
Public Health, University of Cape Town (UCT) to help develop the 
programme‟s M&E systems further.4   
 
In December 1999, once Goemaere had established „anchorage‟ with the 
PMTCT pilot, he approached the provincial administration in order to formalize 
the collaboration. Goemaere met with Fareed Abdullah, Director General of the 
Western Cape Department of Health, and the head of the province‟s HIV 
management team, to suggest that the Provincial Administration establish a 
partnership with MSF to broaden the scope of HIV services offered in 
Khayelitsha. Abdullah was initially very „cold‟, because he feared that MSF 
would draw publicity to the programme, resulting in its closure by the National 
Department of Health (ibid). After an extensive negotiation process, Abdullah 
consented to Goemaere‟s involvement in the PMTCT programme, but solely in 
his personal capacity as a clinician and researcher rather than as a representative 
                                           
4
 As of March 2011, the Western Cape remained the only province with a sufficiently strong 
M&E system to be able to report monthly on its ART programme. 
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of MSF. This was to protect the PMTCT programme from the National Health 
Department, and is an example of the strategies used by key actors within the 
partnership to circumvent national government‟s restrictions on public ART 
access. 
 
In April 2000, the partnership between Goemaere and the Western Cape 
administration was formalised. MSF‟s support roles included providing 
postnatal care, establishing a voluntary HIV counselling and testing (VCT) 
service within the clinics, and training the nurses on the PMTCT programme. 
At the beginning of 2001, most of the HIV testing was done at the two 
antenatal clinics providing PMTCT. However, in 2002, the Provincial Health 
Department extended VCT services to all primary health clinics in 
Khayelitsha, and integrated testing services with tuberculosis, family planning 
and sexually transmitted diseases programmes. The extension of VCT services 
resulted in a rapid increase in annual totals of HIV tests conducted in 
Khayelitsha, from 450 in 1998, to over 32,000 in 2007 (MSF et al. 2008)  
The pilot demonstrated clearly that PMTCT could be effective in resource-
limited settings (MSF et al. 2003b). In 2001, the PMTCT programme was 
expanded to more than 300 antenatal and child health clinics in the Western 
Cape (Abdullah 2005a).  
 
 
Piloting HAART  
 
In April 2000, the partnership between the Provincial Administration and MSF 
opened three dedicated HIV treatment sites within primary health clinics in 
Khayelitsha. These clinics provided treatment and support for opportunistic 
infections, but at this stage excluded ART. However, a few months later, in May 
2001, the same two clinics that had begun providing PMTCT in early 1999 
began initiating patients onto ART. This treatment pilot was facilitated by the 
partnership between MSF and the provincial government, and was South 
Africa‟s first public provision of ART beyond the purpose of PMTCT (MSF et 
al. 2003a). 
 
The pilot was initiated to demonstrate that public ART provision was feasible in 
primary health care settings and resource-limited environments (MSF et al. 2003b). 
In its early months, the programme met with resistance from nurses, who feared that 
they would be infected with HIV from their contact with patients (pers. comm. 
Goemaere 2010). Nurses also believed that the programme would fail because 
stigma would prevent people from seeking testing and treatment. But after the 
clinics had been open for a matter of months, they were „packed‟. Goemaere 
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explained that: „As soon as people discovered there was a possibility to have a 
service for HIV, they ran for it...‟ (ibid). As of August 2008, Khayelitsha‟s ART 
roll-out had expanded to seven sites, and over 10,000 people had initiated treatment 
through the programme. As of July 2008, over 93% were alive and remained in 
care, demonstrating high rates of retention (MSF et al. 2008).  
 
Initially the programme was run exclusively by MSF. Increased staff capacity 
at the three clinics resulted in over 40,000 consultations in 2004 (Provincial 
Administration of the Western Cape, Department of Health 2005b). The baseline 
CD4 count of people starting ART increased from 48 in 2001 to 131 in 2007 
(MSF et al. 2008; Boulle et al. 2010: 563). Patients were therefore initiating 
treatment at an earlier stage in their disease progression, with concomitant 
positive effects on health outcomes and declining mortality rates (Boulle et al. 
2008: 683).  
 
Shortly after the introduction of the three MSF clinics, the HIV Research Unit at 
UCT, together with AIDS Directorate of the Western Cape and the Community 
Health Services Organisation, established an ART clinic in Gugulethu (Bekker 
et al. 2003). Funding for the programme was provided by UK-based charities, 
and researchers established a monitoring study to measure the programme‟s 
outcomes (ibid). As with the partnership between MSF and the Provincial 
Administration, the aim of this partnership was to prove that ART could be 
provided sustainably and effectively using an easily replicable model of service 
delivery. The study also aimed to counter the contention circulating within 
international aid and development circles that patients living in sub-Saharan 
Africa should not be given public access to ART because of expectations of 
poor adherence. Even in the absence of formal adherence interventions, the 
study showed that these expectations were unfounded. The levels of adherence 
and viral suppression it demonstrated were similar to, or better than, those that 
had been reported in most observational and clinical trial cohorts in developed 
countries (Orrell et al. 2003). The study therefore demonstrated that low socio-
economic status and the absence of formal adherence interventions were not 
barriers to successful patient adherence to ART. 
 
In addition to the partnerships it had established in Khayelitsha and Gugulethu, 
the Provincial Health Department established formal alliances with other NGOs 
and research initiatives working in public health facilities around the Western 
Cape (pers. comm. Cloete 2005). From 2000, the Western Cape expanded its 
partnership base to support the roll-out of ART in other clinics. With the 
resources provided through these partnerships, by the end of 2003 the Western 
Cape had established ARV sites in clinics in Gugulethu, Khayelitsha (3 sites) 
and  Langa, and at hospitals including G F Jooste, Tygerberg, Red Cross and 
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Groote Schuur (Abdullah 2005a). The partnership with the organisation 
Kidzpositive at Groote Schuur Hospital improved the quality of paediatric ART 
services available in the public health sector (Abdullah 2005a). In 2003, the 
Provincial Administration included the organisation Absolute Return for Kids 
(ARK, which has since borne another treatment provision NGO named 
Kheth‟Impilo) in its ART partnership. ARK assisted with the scale up of new 
ART sites by incorporating a team of doctors, nurses and pharmacists to 
improve capacity at ARV sites (pers. comm. Cloete 2005). 
 
 
Grant SAF–304–G04–H: ‘Strengthening and 
expanding the Western Cape HIV/AIDS prevention, 
treatment and care programmes’ 
 
Due to Department of Health‟s opposition to the public roll-out of ART prior to 
2003, the funding required by the Western Cape to expand access to ART in the 
province was unavailable through ordinary channels of state revenue. The 
Western Cape therefore began to explore means of procuring external funding to 
finance the scale up of the pilot programme. It submitted its first proposal to the 
Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria as a part of Round Two of 
the Global Fund‟s grant submissions, but the application failed. This was the 
result of weaknesses in the overall application submitted by the South African 
National AIDS Council (SANAC), South Africa‟s Country Coordinating 
Mechanism (pers. comm. Boulle 2005). The Global Fund‟s report on South 
Africa‟s application cited the following reasons for its decline: the Country 
Coordinating Mechanism had not developed adequate impact indicators and 
targets; it had excluded a work plan in its summary document, it had failed to 
provide unit costs or a budget for drugs expenditure, and it had included an 
unjustifiably high contingency amount of $10 million (Global Fund 2003). 
 
At the time of SANAC‟s submission to the Global Fund, a disagreement 
unfolded between national government officials, including Health Minister 
Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, and the Global Fund Secretariat. The source of the 
conflict was the Global Fund‟s grant to the province of KwaZulu-Natal, which 
included funding for ART provision. Department of Health officials alleged that 
the proposal had been submitted to the Global Fund prior to obtaining official 
approval (Cullinan 2003). The relationship between SANAC and the Global 
Fund deteriorated, derailing all of the constituent applications. In April 2003, 
Richard Feachem, the Executive Director of the Global Fund, traveled to South 
Africa to meet with government with the aim of solving the issues around the 
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grant and finalizing the Global Fund‟s agreement with SANAC. However, the 
problems proved intractable, and the negotiations failed. 
By this time, the Khayelitsha ART pilot programme was „up and running‟ and 
had „sparked Feacham‟s interest‟ (pers. comm. Goemaere 2005). The 
programme was gaining renown gradually, particularly after its use as a case 
study on best practices in ART provision in a publication by the World Health 
Organisation (ibid; MSF et al. 2003b). MSF and the Provincial Administration 
invited Feacham to visit the three Khayelitsha sites, where they demonstrated 
the successes of the programme in terms of increased enrolments, high rates of 
adherence to treatment, increased rates of PMTCT, and increased CD4 counts at 
the time of enrolment (pers. comm. Goemaere 2010). As a result, Feacham 
encouraged key figures within the partnership to submit another application for 
a Global Fund grant.  
 
In contrast to the National Government, which had „blocked‟ the Global Fund 
grant to the provincial Health Department of KwaZulu-Natal, the Western Cape 
Provincial Administration and its partners were „ready and keen‟ to expand their 
pilot ART programme (pers. comm. Goemaere 2005). The Global Fund 
requested that the provincial government draft a second proposal, and advised 
key leaders within the provincial Health Department to include its partners in the 
drafting process. The second proposal was therefore more inclusive, involving a 
number of NGOs and research institutes. Officials from the Western Cape 
Provincial Administration worked hard on the application, putting in hours of 
overtime and working late into the night (pers comm. Goemaere 2005). 
 
The application was re-submitted by the Western Cape Provincial Department of 
Health in May 2003, and the Global Fund began its assessment. As a part of this 
process, the Global Fund hired KPMG, an accounting firm, to examine the 
province‟s health management infrastructure. KMPG found weaknesses in the 
management and functioning of the Western Cape medical depot, including 
inefficient procurement and delivery systems. It recommended that the province 
improve the functioning of the medical depot before its application would be 
finalised (pers. comm. Abdullah 2005). Within six weeks, the province had 
established a separate medical depot dedicated to ART. This provided a short-
term solution, allowing it to establish efficient drugs ordering and distribution 
processes which bypassed the existing medical depot. This met KPMG‟s 
requirements, and the final grant agreement was signed in August 2004 (Global 
Fund 2006). 
 
The first disbursement of funds arrived in October, and was, at that time, the 
largest grant awarded by the Global Fund to a provincial department (Provincial 
Administration of the Western Cape 2003b). The grant was to strengthen and 
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expand the province‟s comprehensive HIV/AIDS programme, with a total value 
of US$66,5 million spaced over a period of five years (see Table 1 for a 
breakdown of costs for the grant‟s first two years). The Global Fund invested 
heavily in the programme because it realised its potential for increasing the 
demand for treatment, and for exerting pressure on government to implement a 
national ART programme. In this sense, the Global Fund‟s awarding of the grant 
to the Western Cape was a means of „twisting government‟s arm‟ (pers. comm. 
Goemaere 2010). The Western Cape‟s ART pilot also accorded with the Global 
Fund‟s focus on capacitating local governments because the programme 
presented a clear exit strategy, after which the Provincial Administration would 
assume responsibility for running and maintaining the programme (ibid).  
 
Table 1: The first two years of the Global Fund grant 
 
The four objectives of the 
Global Fund grant: Year 1 Year 2 Total 
(USD) (USD) (USD) 
ARV Treatment / 
Operational Research 3,560,083 5,607,623 9,167,706 
Peer Education 876,928 932,653 1,809,581 
Palliative Care 858,857 1,586,429 2,445,286 
Community-Based 
Response 866,714 1,220,069 2,086,783 
Total 6,162,582 9,346,774 15,509,356 
(Source: adapted from Western Cape Department of Health 2004c.) 
 
 
Within the first two years of the grant, the Global Fund provided funds for ARV 
treatment sites within five community health clinics in the metropolitan region 
of Cape Town. These were the community health clinics of Gugulethu, 
Khayelitsha Site B, Khayelitsha Site C, Michael Mapongwana, and 
Masiphumelele. As explained above, each of the five sites was run by the 
Provincial Administration in tandem with an NGO or clinical research institute, 
and all were pilot research sites prior to receiving support from the Global Fund. 
This was a deliberate strategy by the Provincial Administration to channel funds 
into programmes that were already established, and to ensure that funds were 
spent on scaling-up rather than initiating programmes (pers. comm. Abdullah  
2005).  
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Table 2: Global Fund Grant Objective 1, ARV Treatment Year 1 
 
Key Indicators 
Intended results/targets in year 1  
Quarter 
1 
Quarter 
2 
Quarter 
3 
Quarter 
4 
Objective 1 
Cumulative 
number of 
patients 
started on 
ARV 
treatment at 
5 sites 
Gugulethu 410 560 710 860 
Khayelitsha Site B 490 580 670 760 
Khayelitsha Site C 395 470 545 620 
Khayelitsha 
375 450 525 600 Michael Mapongwana 
Masiphumelele 95 170 245 320 
Total 1765 2230 2695 3160 
       
(Source: Adapted from the Global Fund Monitoring and Evaluation Plan, 
Western Cape Department of Health 2004.) 
 
Each clinic was given specific targets for the number of patients initiated onto 
ART (as seen in Table 2), and the success of the grant‟s ART component was 
measured by the cumulative number of patients on treatment at each of the sites. 
Data about the number of patients initiating treatment and the number of patients 
discontinuing treatment were also captured for progress reports. The sites 
generally managed to meet or exceed their ART initiation targets. Default rates, 
as patients were lost to follow-up, discontinued treatment or died, affected the 
cumulative number on ART. In the first year, a total of 334 patients 
discontinued treatment and some clinics performed slightly under target. Despite 
this, the grant exceeded its targets, both in terms of initiating new patients onto 
ART and in the total number of people on treatment. Figure 2 illustrates the 
success of the grant in initiating new patients within the first year. The original 
target was to initiate 1 860 patients onto ART within twelve months, but this 
target was exceeded by 356 patients, with 2 216 being initiated. By the end of 
June 2005, 3 319 patients had been initiated across the five sites. 
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Figure 1: Number of patients on ART at the five Global Fund sites by the 
end of June 2005 
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(Source: Provincial Administration of the Western Cape 2005c.) 
 
 
Figure 2: Number started on treatment at 5 global Fund Sites 
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The Western Cape’s provincial scale up of ART 
 
In July 2002, TAC won a court victory against the Department of Health which 
compelled government to roll-out a PMTCT programme in the public sector 
(Nattrass 2007). Subsequently, TAC began to advocate for the establishment of 
a national programme of ART. During President Thabo Mbeki‟s „State of the 
Nation‟ address on 14 February 2003, approximately 15 000 people marched to 
parliament in protest against government‟s delays in ART provision (ibid). 
Shortly thereafter, Health Minister Tshabalala-Msimang briefed the 
Parliamentary Health Portfolio Committee on the importance of nutritional 
interventions in treating AIDS, citing the work of AIDS dissident Robert 
Giraldo who claimed nevirapine was toxic and that optimal nutrition could 
prevent and treat AIDS (Giraldo 2002). In response, TAC launched a civil 
disobedience campaign. Activists occupied police stations and government 
buildings, and laid charges of murder against senior government officials.  
 
By August 2003, high-ranking, internal opposition to Mbeki and Tshabalala-
Msimang‟s HIV response had gained momentum, and Cabinet released a 
statement in support of a national ART programme. In November 2003, the 
Operational Plan on Comprehensive HIV and AIDS Care, Management and 
Treatment for South Africa was published, committing government to the 
establishment of at least one ART pilot site within every health district within 
the next year (Department of Health 2003). 
 
Following Cabinet‟s commitment to the Operational Plan, the Western Cape 
built on the success of its ART pilot programmes funded by the Global Fund, 
and began to scale up ART provision through public health sites from 2004 
onwards (Abdullah 2005a). Due to the working knowledge of operational 
issues that the province had gained from the pilot PMTCT and ART 
projects, it developed a strategy for the province-wide roll-out of ART (pers. 
comm. Cloete 2005). 
 
The province‟s roll-out was conducted according to a detailed implementation 
plan, updated every month, in order to ensure that targets were met. The 
province used the demographic and epidemiological model developed by the 
Actuarial Society of South Africa (ASSA) to predict the total number of patients 
in need of treatment. The ASSA model also predicts the proportion of people 
with HIV by disease stage, therefore allowing for global annual estimates of 
patients requiring treatment. These estimates were converted into site-by-site 
estimates of treatment demand, although this process required some guesswork 
(Abdullah 2005b). As a result, broad estimates were calculated for high, medium 
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and low prevalence areas, and this data informed the provincial Health 
Department‟s placement of ART sites. 
 
By April 2004, by which time the national ART programme had been launched, 
the Western Cape had 16 ART sites, 8 of which were integrated into primary 
care clinics (Boulle et al. 2008: 679). The programme‟s average monthly 
enrolment rate increased rapidly between 2004/05 and 2008/09 (see Table 3). By 
mid 2008, there were 79 public health clinics offering ART in the Western 
Cape, and overall, 50 846 adults and 5 282 children had initiated ART in the 
province, totaling 56 121 (Western Cape Department of Health 2009).  
 
Table 3: Western Cape provincial ART programme average enrolment 
per month 
 
(Source: Western Cape Department of Health 2009) 
 
 
Discussion 
 
The role of the Western Cape’s ART partnership 
 
In interviews with key players in the partnership, numerous informants 
highlighted the importance of the symbiotic working relationships established 
between key figures in civil society, MSF and the Western Cape Administration, 
helping to strengthen synergies between the organisations. For instance, 
Goemaere described his relationship with Abdullah as his best professional 
relationship in thirty years of clinical practice (pers. comm. Goemaere 
2005).The partnership established to expedite access to ART was described by 
Abdullah as the „main factor‟ in the success of the provincial roll-out (ibid). In 
describing the efficacy of the partnership, Abdullah wrote: “We were all on one 
side – the virus on the other” (Abdullah 2005a). 
Year Average enrolled per 
month 
Range Increase 
from 
previous 
year 
   
2004 – 2005 494 (269 – 1600) - 
2005 – 2006 843 (550 – 1 165) 70.6% 
2006 – 2007 1 048 (603 – 1 189) 24.30% 
2007 – 2008 1 171 (684 – 1 600) 11.70% 
2008 – 2009 1 737 (1 212 – 22 79) 48.30% 
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The decision to involve civil society and establish partnerships with MSF and 
other non-profit health service providers and research institutions was taken by 
the provincial administration‟s HIV management team, led by Abdullah. 
Because he was also the Director General of Health in the province, Abdullah 
was positioned well to implement and manage the programme, drawing on 
alliances within government and between partner organizations and donors. 
Initially, the partnership established to pilot the ART roll-out managed to 
circumvent many of the issues stemming from the lack of national funding for 
the programme. It did this by capitalizing on the resource capacities of its 
partner organisations. The Global Fund provided the money to finance the 
programme, and academic institutions helped to establish and implement M&E 
systems, and conducted the operational and clinical research that established 
best practices for scale up. TAC mobilised community support for the ART 
programme and helped to create an enabling environment for people to live 
openly with HIV.   
 
Through the strategic use of MSF resources and personnel in the roll-out of 
PMTCT, Abdullah was able to cushion the project from opposition by the 
National Health Department. According to Goemaere (pers. comm. 2010), the 
pilot was represented as „private research‟, when it was „in fact a governmental 
site‟. At the same time, the experience gleaned from the PMTCT pilot could be 
used to inform the provincial scale up which started in 2001, and which 
continued rapidly after the passing of the Operational Plan in 2003. 
 
Although the Provincial Department of Health would have succeeded in 
making the pilot ART sites operational, MSF accelerated the rates of 
treatment coverage, coordinated the training of healthcare workers onsite, and 
improved the quality of clinical care. Boulle described Khayelitsha as „a very 
challenging surface context‟ (pers. comm. Boulle 2005). He explained that many 
NGOs would have avoided piloting an ART programme there because of the 
resource constraints and the heavy burden of infectious and non-communicable 
diseases. However, MSF‟s „strong political and advocacy vision‟, particularly in 
light of South Africa‟s political opposition to treatment, provided the impetus to 
enter into a partnership with the provincial government (ibid). 
 
The province‟s partnerships with MSF (operating from Khayelitsha), the 
Desmond Tutu HIV Centre (operating from Gugulethu), Absolute Return for 
Kids (strengthening clinical capacity at a range of clinics) and academic research 
units based at UCT were also integral to its successful performance in relation to 
the Global Fund grant (Abdullah 2005a). These partnerships provided the 
Provincial Administration with vital resources for the functioning of the ART 
pilot programmes, particularly in the early years of the rollout during which the 
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They conducted operational research projects which indicated that ART could 
be provided successfully and sustainably in resource-poor environments, and 
that adherence rates could match or exceed those in developing countries (Orrell 
et al. 2003). They also expanded the province‟s skills and knowledge base and 
augmented its human resource capacities. 
 
 
Performance-based management 
 
Abdullah and other key leaders of the programme strived to address the 
fragmentation in the provincial health service through a „novel coordination 
mechanism‟ that was termed „vertical support‟ (Abdullah et al. 2001). Managers 
and clinicians were integrated into a common decision-making structure that met 
regularly to formulate policy for the ART programme. As new ART sites were 
activated in the province, site managers and clinicians were brought into 
management structures. This ensured that managers were aware of the clinical 
challenges faced by healthcare workers, and also that clinicians were apprised of 
the managerial issues including administrative and infrastructural constraints 
within the public health sector (Abdullah 2005b). As a result, closely knit 
partnerships were developed internally between provincial health officials and 
their partners in the ART roll-out.   
 
The management style of the HIV/AIDS team in Western Cape was a crucial 
factor in the success of the ART programme. Numerous informants 
emphasised the importance of an integrated management model and effective 
leadership in the programme‟s success. The management model aimed to 
meet the Global Fund‟s stringent performance requirements, to generate high 
quality data, and to monitor and evaluate the programme‟s outcomes, 
implementing changes required for improvements. 
 
The implementation and management of the Global Fund grant was carried out 
within existing programmes in the provincial administration. With the exception 
of the special ARV depot, no parallel systems and structures were developed 
(pers. comm. Frankish 2005). A small number of additional personnel were 
appointed in the first year of the grant to coordinate the province‟s performance, 
including a Grant Programme Manager. This manager encouraged congruence 
between the broader objectives of the Global Fund (invested in funding ART 
„success stories‟ in resource-limited settings) and the Western Cape provincial 
administration (which was going against national policies by providing public 
access to ART).  
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The management model for the Global Fund grant generated „energy… 
enthusiasm [and] motivation around the ART pilot‟ (pers. comm. Goemaere 
2005).The partnership‟s working culture was characterised by high levels of 
motivation and integration. Informants emphasised how partners cooperated to 
manage challenges effectively (pers. comm. Cloete 2005; pers. comm. Slingers 
2005). For instance, when clinics faced shortage of healthcare workers, leaders 
of partner organisations phoned experienced doctors and nurses to invite them 
personally to work at ART sites (ibid).  
 
All staff members involved in administrative and managerial functions relating 
to the Global Fund grant met for monthly progress reports (pers. comm 
Abdullah 2005). These meetings helped encourage staff to meet their targets and 
to establish a performance-based organizational culture (pers. comm. Naidoo 
2005). Because of the political risks that the province was taking in providing 
ART in contravention of national health policy, key figures were highly 
motivated to ensure that the programme succeeded (pers. comm. Maartens 
2005). Management systems were therefore developed to ensure the best 
outcomes for the programme, and were intended to enhance cooperation, 
integration, evaluation and continual improvement.  
 
Many informants attributed the success of the ART pilot to the careful selection 
of managers on the team, and to the drive and commitment of the partnership‟s 
key figures. Informants explained that high levels of expertise across different 
components of the programme, encompassing clinical aspects, drugs supply and 
distribution, resources management and reporting, were instrumental to the 
programme‟s functioning, assessment and improvement. They ascribed the 
characteristics of charisma, courage and foresight to Abdullah, whose leadership 
style was understood as a central component in the programme‟s success (pers. 
comm. Channing 2005; pers. comm. Slingers 2005; pers. comm. Maartens 
2005). Abdullah conducted site visits regularly to „see for himself what was 
happening‟. On these visits, he would gather together clinicians, managers and 
health workers working within the ART programme to assess its functioning 
collectively. He also focused on motivating staff, explaining how „they were 
pioneers, they were making history‟ (pers. comm. Goemaere 2010). The result 
was that staff members felt inspired, and were willing to „walk extra miles, to 
make sure things were successful‟ (ibid). 
 
 
Involvement of civil society 
 
From the onset of HIV treatment provision in the Western Cape in 1999, civil 
society organisations played a crucial role in mobilizing grassroots support 
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for the scale up of treatment and other medical and support services for 
people living with HIV (MSF et al. 2003b). Foremost among these 
organisations was TAC, whose access to medicines and HIV awareness 
campaigns made it an obvious partner for both MSF and the provincial 
government. By 2000, TAC had established numerous branches in the 
Western Cape, including a branch in Khayelitsha which aligned itself with the 
clinics that were providing ART to the surrounding community. TAC‟s 
efficacy as a community organizer and partner to the ART roll-out established 
a „new social contract‟ around HIV in Khayelitsha, in which the clinics 
provided effective HIV treatment, and the community encouraged HIV 
disclosure, and promoted HIV prevention and treatment advocacy (ibid). 
 
TAC conducted advocacy work to challenge HIV stigma, encourage people to 
test for HIV, and to mobilise thousands of community activists in support of 
public access to ART (ibid). On the local level, TAC established Project 
Ulwazi (knowledge) in which people living positively and openly with HIV 
would conduct awareness workshops in various contexts. In 2002, Project 
Ulwazi volunteers created a mobile exhibition called Yazinzulu-i-HIV (know 
more about HIV). The exhibition focused on testing, disclosure and positive 
living, and toured public spaces in Khayelitsha (MSF et al. 2003a). Local 
leaders from schools, churches and other community organisations were 
invited to join the workshops and discussions about HIV and human rights, to 
expand community awareness, and to generate support for the local testing 
and treatment programmes.  
 
On the provincial and national levels, TAC built up networks with 
sympathetic journalists and produced its own HIV activist programmes on 
radio and television to mobilize public support for HIV treatment access 
(Hodes 2010a). Generating evidence-based and accessible content, TAC and 
its media partners educated the public about HIV prevention, transmission 
and treatment at a time in which high-ranking government officials were 
sowing confusion about the basic science of HIV and ART. TAC began its 
Treatment Literacy project in 2002, with the objective of training thousands 
of community activists through treatment literacy programmes. The 
Community Health Media Trust, a media production NGO, was founded by 
Zackie Achmat and Jack Lewis, both of whom were co-founders of TAC. The 
Community Health Media Trust worked closely with TAC, producing a series 
of treatment literacy videos which, from 2002, were screened in workshops 
run by trained peer educators in the Khayelitsha clinics. Peer educators were 
also equipped with portable audiovisual kits and copies of the Treatment 
Literacy Series, which they screened as part of their HIV education and 
advocacy workshops (Hodes 2010b). TAC‟s Treatment Literacy Project, with 
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the collaboration of the Community Health Media Trust, has been termed „the 
most important mass cultural project in South Africa in support of science‟ 
(Nattrass 2007).  
 
Goemaere described TAC‟s involvement with MSF and the Provincial 
Administration as the „main success factor‟ in the ART partnership (pers. 
comm. Goemaere 2005). He explained that the provincial government and 
MSF had created a „technical proposal‟ for the provision of ART in 
Khayelitsha, and that TAC generated the grassroots support that enabled the 
pilot to succeed practically through encouraging people to use the services, to 
disclose their HIV status, and to promote treatment access and adherence in 
the community. Keith Cloete, the Chief Director of the Metro District Health 
Services in the Western Cape, maintained that TAC‟s community 
mobilization generated support for the treatment programme in ways which 
were beyond the scope of MSF and the provincial administration (pers. comm. 
2005). This community connection was vital due to the initial antagonism 
towards the programme emanating from a range of sources, including, at the 
programme‟s onset, the nurses working within the clinics (pers. comm. 
Goemaere 2010). 
 
It is difficult to quantify the impact of TAC‟s partnership with MSF and the 
Provincial Administration in the success of the Khayelitsha ART pilot. 
However, it is likely that TAC‟s advocacy work and its awareness campaigns 
made a significant impact on the community‟s understanding of the disease and 
the willingness of individuals to present for VCT. Research supports these 
claims. Parket et al. (2002) have shown that Khayelitsha residents are more 
willing to test for HIV, and have higher levels of condom use. A cross-sectional 
descriptive study that assessed inequalities of access to HIV services in the 
subdistricts in the Eastern Cape, Free State and the Western Cape indicated that 
the utilisation of HIV services including VCT and PMTCT was highest in 
Khayelitsha (Scott 2005).  
 
TAC‟s relationship with national government grew increasingly hostile after the 
1998 decision by the Department of Health, under Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-
Zuma, against providing public access to PMTCT programmes. However, its 
relationship with the provincial leadership of the Western Cape was 
strengthened through their collaboration on the province‟s ART pilot 
programme. Because of the Western Cape‟s provision of public access to ART, 
TAC was able to „affirm‟ the province‟s work, rather than „attacking‟ it (pers. 
comm. Toms 2005). In turn, the Western Cape‟s ART programme strengthened 
the collective identity of the „positive community‟. Dozens of TAC branches 
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were established across South Africa as the treatment access movement gained 
momentum, and TAC‟s Khayelitsha base remains one of its strongest.  
 
 
Health infrastructure 
 
The public health system inherited by the ANC-led government was 
characterised by fragmentation between provinces and departments, and by the 
grossly inequitable distribution of resources (Schneider et al. 2007). This was 
particularly apparent in the concentration of public expenditure for health on a 
small number of tertiary and academic hospitals, while comparatively little was 
spent on primary health care (McIntyre et al. 1995). In 1995, the estimated 
shortfall of primary health care clinics ranged from 600 – 1000 clinics (ibid). 
 
The Western Cape had several advantages that enabled it to roll-out ART more 
quickly and effectively than other provinces. Historically, the Western Cape 
provincial health system is better resourced and more effectively managed, 
providing a higher standard of public healthcare than in other provinces 
(Schneider et al. 2007). The province has relatively good pre-existing health 
structure including tertiary hospitals, mobile clinics and district and community 
clinics (Abdullah 2005a). Moreover, the province is predominantly urban, with 
the majority of its population living in and around Cape Town. The Western 
Cape has the lowest HIV prevalence in South Africa, which means that the 
demand for treatment is smaller than in other provinces. Cape Town also has 
greater success in retaining health professionals than poor, rural areas. However, 
in contrast to most other South African provinces whose HIV epidemics have 
already peaked, the number of new AIDS sick patients in the Western Cape 
continues to grow each year. This is due largely to migration, which continues to 
thwart the province‟s advances in closing the treatment gap (Western Cape 
Department of Health 2008).  
 
 
The programme’s evolution  
 
The Western Cape Health Department chose to limit the number of clinics 
providing ART to approximately 40 (pers. comm. Cloete 2005). The strategic 
reasons for this were that a smaller number of clinics would ensure a more 
manageable drugs distribution system, and would guard against human 
resources shortages (ibid). By following this strategy, the provincial Health 
Department could also guarantee that it reached its Global Fund targets and 
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initiated as many people as possible onto ART within a relatively short time 
(ibid).  
 
Limiting the number of province-run ART sites was a controversial strategy, and 
was a short-term solution to strengthen the province‟s capacity before rolling out 
ART in all public health clinics (Abdullah 2005a). Today, the ART programme 
still had its own medical depot, and treatment is available in selected clinics 
only, rather than in every public health facility. Partners continue to play a 
fundamental role in supporting the province‟s provision of ART, and major 
donors such as the Global Fund and PEPFAR continue to fund NGOs and 
research institutes to strengthen the province‟s capacity to maintain and scale up 
its treatment programme (pers. comm. Boulle 2010).  
 
In January 2006 Abdullah resigned from his position to take up an appointment 
at the International HIV/AIDS Alliance. Numerous informants alleged that his 
championing of public access to ART in South Africa, at a time in which this 
clashed with the policy directives of the National Health Department, ruined his 
prospects for further career advancement within the national public health 
sector. Informants alleged that he was pushed out of state health structures 
because he was not considered sufficiently politically pliable.  
 
Although studies have demonstrated the successes of the partnership created to 
roll-out ART in the Western Cape, several challenges remain. As patient 
numbers at ART clinics increased, the public health infrastructure came under 
further strain. Infrastructural improvements, such as the building of new 
facilities to accommodate the expansion of the programme, have suffered 
lengthy delays (pers. comm. Cloete 2005). In order to circumvent these delays, 
partners have mobilised their own resources to bolster service provision. For 
instance, MSF used its own funds to build extra clinic buildings in Khayelitsha 
to accommodate expanding patient numbers (pers. comm. Slingers 2005). 
Further upgrades to clinics‟ infrastructure to support ART provision were 
obstructed by the National Department of Health until the replacement of Health 
Minister Tshabalala-Msimang with Barbara Hogan in 2008. 
 
The city of Cape Town has generally been able to retain sufficient medical staff 
to run its ART programme (Abdullah 2005a). However, shortages of healthcare 
workers continue to impede the functioning of the province‟s rural clinics. The 
provincial government‟s partnerships with organisations such as Absolute 
Return for Kids have helped to alleviate human resource shortages, as these 
organisations have recruited doctors, nurses, pharmacists and peer educators to 
the province‟s ART programme. In order to fund these initiatives, partner 
organisations have established their own partnerships with major donors, 
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including PEPFAR and the Gates Foundation. It is notable, however, that these 
partnerships must function within the parameters set by donor agencies.   
 
The shortage of trained health workers, particularly in rural and disadvantaged 
areas, is one of the greatest barriers to improving access to healthcare across 
South Africa (Schneider et al. 2007). Epidemics of communicable and non-
communicable diseases have increased demands for health services at the same 
time in which human resources for health have shrunk (Bradshaw et al. 2004).  
 
Other challenges to the programme relate to drug resistance, toxicity and a lack 
of nutrition. Key personnel in the provincial Health Department believed that 
they had underestimated the importance of nutrition, and should have included 
nutrition as a component in the Global Fund application (pers. comm. Frankish 
2005). The Provincial Administration could then have provided food parcels to 
patients on HAART at the five Global Fund sites, which are situated in some of 
Cape Town‟s poorest and most malnourished areas. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
One of the most striking features of ART scale up in South Africa has been the 
level of provincial variation in outcomes (Schneider et al. 2010). In 2008, ART 
coverage rates (using national criteria of need) ranged from 26% in the Free 
State, to 72% in the Western Cape (Adam & Johnson 2009). The Western 
Cape‟s establishment of a partnership to roll-out treatment across the 
province was central to its success in piloting and scaling up the public 
provision of ART. Through this partnership, the province was able to 
circumvent the national Department of Health, and to use strategic alliances and 
international funds to implement a provincial ART programme. The partnership 
expanded the knowledge, human resources, capacity and funding available to 
the province. It was therefore able to expand its roll-out more quickly and 
effectively than other provinces. Resources were invested in training healthcare 
workers and in developing an M&E system which could be managed locally 
once the province assumed control of the ART programme. Today, the Western 
Cape remains the only province in South Africa that is able to report quarterly 
on its ART programme. 
 
Early research conducted on the various ART pilot programmes in the 
Western Cape demonstrated that they were both feasible and replicable. 
Recent research on the Khayelitsha treatment programme in specific has 
demonstrated that the programme is also durable, with substantial clinical 
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benefits accruing for patients who were able to access ART through the 
programme since its establishment (Boulle et al. 2010: 563)  
 
From 2007, when the provincial administration assumed full control over the 
provincial ART programme, the rapid progress of the Khayelitsha roll-out 
slowed.  Research conducted by TAC as a part of its 2009 national Resources 
for Health Campaign demonstrated that a number of serious problems 
confronted Khayelitsha‟s ART clinics. These included staff shortages, drug 
stockouts, and relatively high numbers of patients initiating treatment with CD4 
counts below 50. Long waiting lists for ART continued to delay treatment 
access at certain clinics. (TAC 2009). Despite the continual increases in the 
province‟s ART cohort, the Western Cape‟s ART programme has continued to 
demonstrate excellent clinical outcomes, with high levels of retention in care 
and healthier populations initiating ART (Western Cape Department of Health 
2008). Increases in patient enrolment continue, despite growing strain on the 
human resources and the physical capacity of clinics (Western Cape Department 
of Health 2008).  
 
The province‟s partnership with NGOs, academic research institutes and service 
providers continues to evolve. MSF and the School of Public Medicine at UCT 
still collaborate with the provincial Health Department to monitor the 
programme‟s development, and to pioneer ways of advancing the ART scale up. 
This includes new initiatives for the decentralisation of TB/HIV care, 
strengthening the referral system for patients failing second line treatment, 
TB/HIV integration, and piloting new and more efficient ways of retaining 
patients in care.  
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